AEGLIX News
Between October 14 and October 26, an intruder compromised AWS accounts belonging to several Qubole customers and exfiltrated stored secrets and data. The breach leveraged the trusted access relationship that Qubole's platform maintains with customer environments, according to researchers.
Qubole runs inside customers' AWS accounts via an IAM role whose trust policy permits Qubole's AWS account to assume the role, provided each AssumeRole call includes a matching External ID. The attacker employed credentials for an AWS account that Qubole's platform uses to reach customers, though the method by which those credentials were acquired remains undisclosed. Most of the roles assumed during the intrusion were otherwise idle, yet each still trusted Qubole's account, so the attacker's requests succeeded. Every AssumeRole request attributed to the attacker carried an External ID and was accepted, because AWS honors such requests when they originate from the trusted account and supply the correct External ID.
The stolen credentials encompassed victims' own AWS access keys, Entra ID client secrets, and Okta client credentials. Researchers have not connected this campaign to any other publicly documented activity and note that the targeting diverges from what state-sponsored groups typically pursue. In a separate wave from October 8 to October 11, an attacker used customers' own AWS access keys believed to have been provisioned for Qubole and compromised a handful of victims' cloud environments; this activity has not been tied to the AssumeRole abuse. Attacker infrastructure featured OVH-hosted addresses 57.129.54[.]120 and 2001:41d0:70d[:]7800::, plus Mullvad VPN addresses 45.83.220[.]211, 185.209.199[.]73 and 89.37.63[.]175.
No remediation actions, patches, or customer notifications have been disclosed in the available reporting.
Report prepared 2026-11-09 · Based on reporting from The Hacker News. Source publication date above; subsequent developments may not be reflected.