AEGLIX News
Kaspersky researchers have disclosed technical details of a new CoffeeLoader malware variant that leverages an updated Armoury packer to evade analysis and deliver additional payloads to compromised systems. The malware arrives via an NSIS-based installer that drops a patched 7z.dll library into a temporary directory and executes it through rundll32.exe, according to the findings. The modified 7-Zip library contains self-decrypting shellcode representing the latest version of the Armoury packer, which continues to exploit graphics processing units for decryption but has shifted from OpenCL to OpenGL and now delivers intermediate shellcode rather than a dynamic-link library.
CoffeeLoader was first documented by Zscaler ThreatLabz in March 2025, which detailed its use of the Armoury packer to resist analysis and ultimately execute Rhadamanthys shellcode. The packer typically uses file names such as ArmouryAIOSDK.dll and ArmouryA.dll while hijacking legitimate Armoury Crate functionality with self-decrypting shellcode. The updated variant maintains the GPU-based decryption approach but replaces the OpenCL library with OpenGL, and the intermediate shellcode functions as a downloader tasked with retrieving the primary CoffeeLoader malware component.
After achieving execution, the Trojan establishes persistence by copying the malicious 7z.dll to subfolders under %PROGRAMDATA% or %LOCALAPPDATA%, with the subfolder, library, and registry value names generated as eight hexadecimal digits derived from system volume information. The malware creates a registry key that blocks users from disabling autorun through Task Manager. Once persistence is secured, the malware launches a legitimate system process such as dllhost.exe, WerFault.exe, svchost.exe, OpenWith.exe, or AtBroker.exe and injects its code into that process to maintain a foothold on the infected machine.
Kaspersky's disclosure provides defenders with indicators of compromise including the patched 7z.dll file, the specific persistence paths and registry modifications, and the list of legitimate processes targeted for injection. The technical analysis enables detection rules for the NSIS installer behavior, the Armoury packer's shift to OpenGL-based GPU decryption, and the intermediate shellcode downloader stage. No vendor patches or coordinated takedown actions were referenced in the research; the findings are intended to support threat hunting and endpoint detection engineering.
Report prepared 2026-11-16 · Based on reporting from The Hacker News. Source publication date above; subsequent developments may not be reflected.