AEGLIX News
Security firm Layer3 Intel detected multiple residential proxy nodes beaconing from the Executive Office of the President network, identified as autonomous system AS2650, according to research shared with Krebs on Security. The proxy activity was observed between October 5 and November 3, with proxies exiting the White House network 236 times during that period. Layer3 Intel found proxy exit nodes at the White House from six internet addresses on 26 of 30 days, mostly between 5 p.m. and midnight. The White House did not immediately respond to a request for comment.
Synthient attributed the activity from AS2650 to multiple Windows 11 installations of the Infatica proxy program. Infatica founder Vladimir Fomenko is Russian, and his hosting firm King Servers hosted six of the eight internet addresses used by Russia's state security services to compromise Arizona and Illinois election databases in 2016. Layer3 Intel identified 28 separate residential proxy services able to exit through the White House network. The findings add to broader research showing residential proxies in nearly 300 government-owned networks, 318 utility companies, 166 healthcare companies or hospitals, and 141 banking and finance companies, according to Spur data presented in a January 2026 webinar. Infoblox separately discovered that 65% of its customer base was querying one or more residential proxy related domains.
The presence of 28 distinct residential proxy services operating from the Executive Office of the President network indicates a significant infiltration of unauthorized software on government systems. The consistent daily beaconing from six internet addresses over nearly a month, primarily during evening hours, suggests persistent installations rather than transient connections. Synthient's attribution to Infatica, a service linked through its founder's hosting company to previous Russian state security operations, raises questions about the supply chain and intent behind the proxy deployments. The scale of proxy diversity within a single high-value network underscores the difficulty of monitoring and controlling endpoint software in large organizations.
In January 2026, dozens of proxy services were forced to patch their networks after Synthient founder Ben Brundage showed cybercriminals abusing a vulnerability to seize control over devices inside users' local networks. That disclosure followed late 2025 mass exploitation of a widespread vulnerability in residential proxy services, where cybercriminals probed each proxy endpoint's local network for vulnerable systems to infect with malware. The industry-wide patching effort represents the primary documented remediation action related to the residential proxy ecosystem vulnerabilities that enable such infiltrations. No specific White House remediation steps or official acknowledgments have been publicly confirmed.
Report prepared 2026-11-05 · Based on reporting from Krebs on Security. Source publication date above; subsequent developments may not be reflected.
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