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Huntress Analyzes Three Phishing Kits Targeting Microsoft 365 Session Tokens

Based on reporting from BleepingComputer

Published by the source: Tue, 17 Nov 2026 10:01:11 -0500

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Huntress researchers analyzed three modern phishing kits — EvilTokens, Knight Office, and Kali365 — that target Microsoft 365 session tokens and operate with features resembling a software-as-a-service business, including admin dashboards and round-the-clock support. Entry-level attackers who replay a stolen token can access an active session where login and multifactor authentication are already complete, gaining instant access to cloud resources and email.

Early in 2026, Huntress researchers uncovered EvilTokens during a device-code phishing operation that weaponized the Railway Platform-as-a-Service as a token-harvesting and replay engine. Later that same year, a coordinated operation by Microsoft's Digital Crimes Unit and the FBI resulted in the arrest of an individual alleged to operate EvilTokens. Knight Office operates as an adversary-in-the-middle phishing kit that extracts valid Microsoft 365 session tokens and funnels them into an operator console for replay and persistence across tenant accounts. Kali365 packages a complete Phishing-as-a-Service offering into a single control panel, enabling token capture via device-code flows and reverse-proxy lures, replay into live Microsoft 365 sessions, persistent access maintenance, and scaled activity powered by built-in AI capabilities.

In device code phishing, the victim authenticates directly with the identity provider while the attacker captures the resulting authorization, so the victim never types credentials into an unfamiliar page. Adversary-in-the-middle attacks reveal multifactor authentication limitations because the threat actor relays the authentication flow in real time while the victim completes the MFA prompt and the attacker captures the resulting session information.

Security teams should revoke refresh tokens, eliminate unauthorized devices and Windows Hello credentials, restrict or block device-code authentication, and examine mailbox access, forwarding rules, and outbound phishing activity. They should also watch for token replay or re-entry attempts and continue threat hunting even after the initial phishing domain is taken down.

Report prepared 2026-11-17 · Based on reporting from BleepingComputer. Source publication date above; subsequent developments may not be reflected.

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