AEGLIX News
Security researchers Shubham Shah and Sam Curry discovered that login systems behind two car brands' mobile applications could be completely compromised through default administrator credentials on a ForgeRock identity platform, now part of Ping Identity, allowing unauthorized access to any customer account and the ability to unlock doors and start engines of connected vehicles. The researchers demonstrated the complete attack chain by changing a target account's email address and password, signing in through the normal app, and receiving the same access tokens used by the legitimate application to control vehicle functions. The attack left minimal traces for vehicle owners, as changing credentials did not log the owner out of their app, and researchers could redirect account alerts to their own phone while suppressing them on the owner's device before restoring the original email address.
Both automakers used ForgeRock's identity platform, which operates in two components: one handling login authentication and another called OpenIDM that stores customer records. OpenIDM includes a built-in administrator console powered by Apache Felix, and ForgeRock's own hardening guide explicitly warns operators to remove this console or protect it before deploying to production because it maintains its own separate password storage. Despite this guidance, the administrator console remained present on the affected servers and was secured only with the documented default credentials of username admin and password admin. While the console was blocked from direct internet access by edge protections, researchers bypassed these controls by manipulating request paths with encoded slashes and extra characters, causing the edge guard to treat requests as harmless static files while the underlying server interpreted them as paths to the administrative console.
Once inside the administrator console, researchers leveraged a built-in scheduler to execute custom scripts on the identity server, gaining a command prompt on the machine housing customer records for both brands' login systems. This access enabled them to open sessions for any customer account on the affected servers. The researchers tested vehicle commands only on cars they owned or were authorized to use, limiting complete chain validation to US accounts and vehicles. The vulnerability's scope extended beyond simple account takeover, as the compromised identity server issued legitimate access tokens that the mobile applications use to communicate with vehicle systems, effectively bridging the gap between identity management and physical vehicle control.
Teams operating the same identity software, now sold as PingIDM, should immediately inspect their deployments for the Apache Felix console accessible at /system/console and either remove it entirely or change its default password. The researchers emphasized that organizations should not rely on edge protections or web application firewall path rules to conceal administrative interfaces, as these controls can be circumvented through path manipulation techniques. The findings highlight the critical importance of following vendor hardening guidance for identity platforms that serve as gateways to safety-critical vehicle functions.
Report prepared 2026-11-09 · Based on reporting from The Hacker News. Source publication date above; subsequent developments may not be reflected.